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BRIEF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF SALT LAKE,

]

Plaintiff and ;1
Appellee,
]

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

vs.
RICHARD COPIER,

I

Defendant and ]t
Appellant.
]

Appeal No. 920777-CA
(Argument Priority 2)

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
JUDGE FUCHS

ROBERT H. COPIER - #727
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0099
MARSHA S. ATKIN - #5246
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7767
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(d) and (f).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Issue for review and standard of review: The issue on
appeal is whether alcohol content of "0.08%" or greater by
weight" constitutes a public offense now that the state
enabling statute has been amended to remove the percentage
weight standard and establish an actual measurement standard.
The

Appellate

Court

reviews

such

questions

of

correctness, giving no deference to the trial court.
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE LAW

RULES
U.R.E. 201(g)
U.R.Cr.P. 23
3

law

for

Reeves

STATUTES
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-43(1)
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44(1)(a) and (2)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of driving with a "blood or
breath alcohol content" of "0.08% or greater by weight".

The

Court denied Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment in open
court on September 23, 1992, and entered Judgment September 30,
1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The legislature has provided that local DUI ordinances
must be consistent with state code DUI provisions.

The legislature has amended state code DUI provisions
to remove the "0.08% by weight" standard and replace it with
an actual "0.08 gram" standard stated as an actual quantity
instead of a percentage.

Salt

Lake

City

used

the

old

outdated

percentage

standard in this case, and that allegation does not constitute

4

a public offense now that the state has adopted an actual
quantity standard instead of a percentage standard.

This appeal stands for the proposition that by taking
the trouble to amend state law governing DUI, the state
senate, the state house of representatives, and the governor
intended to change the law governing DUI, and that Salt Lake
City is required to follow the statefs lead by pleading
and proving offenses consistent with said change.

The

failure to do so cannot be cured by a post-trial effort to
have the court take judicial notice that the old and new
standards supposedly mean the same thing and that supposedly
no change was wrought by the amendment to state law.

Salt Lake City's duty to conform to express statutory
enabling law existed under State v. Hutchinson, infra, and
is now even more pronounced now that the Utah Supreme Court
appears to have re-adopted the Dillon rule to a certain
extent in Weese v. Davis County Commission, infra.

ARGUMENT

U.R.Cr.P. 23 provides that at any time prior to the
imposition of sentence, the Court, upon motion of a Defendant,

5

shall arrest judgment if the facts proved do not constitute a
public offense.

Appellant so moved when sentence in this

matter had not yet been imposed and the facts proved at trial
did not constitute a public offense.

Salt
"Defendant

Lake

City

unlawfully

alleged

operated

in

the

or was

information

that

in actual physical

control of a vehicle while Defendant's blood or breath alcohol
content was 0.08% or greater by weight" and made use of a
chemical test at trial to prove this allegation.

This allegation did not constitute a public offense.
Under U.C.A. §41-6-43(1)(1992), ordinances adopted by local
authorities are limited as follows:
(1)

An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs a person's operating or being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence
of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in
relation to any of those matters, the use of a
chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary
presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any
combination of those matters, shall be consistent
with the provisions of this code which govern
those matters.

6

The relevant provision of the Utah Code which governs
this matter appears at U.C.A. §41-6-44(1)(a) and (2) and reads
as follows:
(1)(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by
a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation of physical control or if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug or the combined influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle . . . .
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters
of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath.

The

standards

of

.08

grams

of

alcohol

per

100

milliliters of blood or .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath are standards that materially differ from and are not
consistent with the blood or breath alcohol content of 0.08%
or greater by weight stated in the information and proved at
trial.

The information proved at trial does not constitute a

public offense. Accordingly, any attempt by Salt Lake City to
create a public offense as alleged in the information and
proved at trial is ultra vires and void ab initio under U.C.A.
§41-6-43(1) (1992).

Even under the liberalized standard of

review in State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) in
which the Utah Supreme Court rejected the old Dillon rule that
7

had been previously applied by Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake
City has no power to create, plead, or prove a public offense
that is directly contrary to the affirmative mandate of U.C.A.
41-6-44(1)(a) and (2)(1992), based on Judge Garff's analysis
in Richfield City v. . Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990),
where the state statute had not been amended to use an actual
0.08 grams standard and still used a 0.08% standard.

See also

Weese v. Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992), where
the Utah Supreme Court seems to re-adopt the Dillon test.

Jeopardy having attached, and the Motion to Arrest
Judgment timely filed prior to the imposition of sentence, the
Court should have permanently arrested the Judgment and entered
its order of dismissal with prejudice.

Salt Lake City's request that the trial court take
judicial

notice

after the

jury trial

had been

concluded

violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have the facts
of the case decided by the jury.

Under U.R.E. 201(g), facts judicially noticed are not
binding upon the jury in a criminal case, and therefore, Salt
Lake

City's

post-trial

request

improper.

8

for

judicial

notice

was

Salt Lake City has yet to explain why it failed and
refused to bring its municipal DUI ordinance into conformity
and plead a DUI allegation in this case that followed the
enabling language in state law.

CONCLUSION

The allegation charged in the information and proved
at trial does not constitute a public offense, and judgment
should be reversed in this case.

DATED this

day of

9

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
This is to certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief were hand-carried, to Salt
Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this
i^>
day of May, 1993.
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ADDENDUM

1. Information filed by Salt Lake City in the trial court.
2. Determinative law.

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

SALT LAKE CITY,
A Municipal Corporation
vs.
RICHARD COPIER

INFORMATION

08/19/51
Court Case 925015939TC
DEFENDANT
Judge FMP
ATE OF UTAH
ty and County of Salt Lake

ss.

S. ATKIN
of Salt Lake City,in the County of Salt Lake,
ate of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above
med defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown,
Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah on or about
/30/92 2324
,at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and state
Dresaid did commit the public offense of
DLATING THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE, as follows, to-wit:
NT I:
FENDANT UNLAWFULLY OPERATED OR WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE
ILE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD OR BREATH ALCOHOL CONTENT WAS 0.08% OR GREATER BY
IGHT, OR WHILE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR ANY DRUG OR
E COMBINED INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND ANY DRUG TO A DEGREE WHICH RENDERED
FENDANT INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING A VEHICLE.
A CLASS B
3DEMEAN0R.
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 12-24-100
¥T II:
Eendant failed to stop at the red light semaphore.
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 12-32-030
counts located at approximately 500 S 200 W

:e

Complainant
Salt Lake City Prosecutor
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ground of objection, if the specific gTound was not
apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked,
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may
add any other or further statement which shows the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It
may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form.
tc) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested
to the jury by any mean6, such as making statements
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of
the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court 6hall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(CJ Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests
of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if
he so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not,
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or
recorded statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party
may require him at that time to introduce any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts.

Rule 402

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice
has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may. but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed.
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS.
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence
of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither
presumption applies.
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS
LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.

ule 22
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(8^ If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment
all, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric
curity Review Board, be made a condition of parole,
lilure to continue treatment or other condition of
role except by agreement with the designated men1 health services provider and the Board of Pardons
a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The
riod of parole may not be for fewer than five years
until the expiration of the defendant's sentence,
lichever comes first, and may not be reduced witht consideration by the Board of Pardons of a curnt report on the mental health status of the ofnder.
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by
the sentencing court, shall be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board
shall make treatment a condition of probation if
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facilities exist for treatment of the offender in a probation status. Reports as specified by the trial judge
shall be filed with the probation officer and the
sentencing court.
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of probation, except by agreement with the
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation of probation violation hearings. The period of probation
may not be for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a current
report on the mental health status of the offender.
(c^ Treatment or other care may be provided
by or under contract with the Division of Mental
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board, any other mental health provider. A report shall be filed with the probation officer and
the sentencing court every three months during
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition
to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report.
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation
may not be heard more than once every six
months.
10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility
under this section prior to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the court within 60 days after that date for
review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include commitment
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.
(b) With regard to persons who have been
placed on probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the executive director of the
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall
petition the court within 60 days after that date
for review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.

ing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or
recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present
any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the
court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make his return
on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.

le 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
i) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or
i of no contest, the court shall set a time for impos-

Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is charged
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances.
Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems
reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in
the same position as if no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either
in evidence or in argument.

MOTOR VEHICLES
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(2) If a damaged vehicle 6ticker describing the
damage is affixed to the vehicle, a report under this
section is not required.
1987
41-6-40.

A c c i d e n t r e p o r t s — When confidential
— I n s u r a n c e policy information — U s e
as evidence — Penalty for false information.
(1) All written reports required in this article to be
forwarded to the department by operators or owners
of vehicles involved in accidents or by garages are
without prejudice to the reporting individual and are
for the confidential use of the department or other
state agencies having use for the records for accident
prevention purposes. However, the department may
disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when the identity is not otherwise known or
when the person denies his presence at the accident.
The department shall disclose whether any person or
vehicle involved in an accident reported under this
section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and
the name of the insurer.
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section
may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the
department shall furnish upon demand of any party
to the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate
showing that a specified accident report has or has
not been made to the department in compliance with
law, and if the report has been made, the date, time,
and location of the accident, the names and addresses
of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved,
and the investigating officers. The reports may be
used as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges
filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3).
(3) A person who gives information in oral or written reports as required in this chapter knowing or
having reason to believe that the information is false
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
i&87
41-6-41.

Statistical information r e g a r d i n g accid e n t s — A n n u a l publication.
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all
accident reports and shall publish annually, or at
more frequent intervals, related statistical information as to the number and circumstances of traffic
accidents.
1987

41-6-42. Local p o w e r s t o r e q u i r e r e p o r t
A local authority may by ordinance require that
the operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, or
the owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated
municipal department a written report of the accident or a copy of any report required under this article to be filed with the department on accidents occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the
confidential use of the municipal department and are
subject to Section 41-6-40.
i$87
ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED A N D
R E C K L E S S DRIVING
41-6-43.

Local D U I a n d related o r d i n a n c e s a n d
reckless driving ordinances — Consistent with code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those

41HH44

matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests,
or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that
governs any combination of those matters, shall be
consistent with the provisions in this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in
willful or wanton disregard for the 6afety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of
this code which govern those matters.
iss"
41-6-43.10.
41-6-44.

Repealed.

1985

Driving under the influence of alcohol
or drug or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol —
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension
or revocation of license.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown
by a chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control, or if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like
or similar circumstances.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor
more than 50 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order
the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation
committed within six years of a prior violation
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43 the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
720 hours.

